Introduction
The need to protect 'political expediency' long undermined the development of international human rights.
1 Governments had so long used other states' human-rights records as bargaining chips in international relations, emphasising some perceived abuses whilst Whereas this approach marginalised the role of domestic courts in emergency situations, under the ECHR states could continue to 'take measures derogating from its obligations' in response to 'war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation', but only 'to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation'. 4 This provision was designed 'to ensure that even exceptional state action remains governed by independent norms, which in turn allows for supervision by independent tribunals'. 5 One of the ECHR institutions' first tasks was therefore to develop the legal requirements for derogations, in the face of two countervailing concerns. If Strasbourg was too rigorous in its interpretation of Article 15's requirements, states might begin to abandon the ECHR system before it had the opportunity to establish itself. By contrast, if states were nineteenth century authoritative voices insisted that a soldier tasked with restoring order in the face of a riot or insurrection is 'only a citizen armed in a particular manner'. 11 In other words, the authorities enjoyed no inherent special powers with regard to emergencies under the UK's "ancient constitution", short of a declaration of martial law. Where the Crown's forces resorted to force to address an emergency, the common law ordinarily required that it be proportionate to the threat at issue. 12 Martial law, by contrast, enabled the military to take all steps within their power to address an emergency, including trial of civilians by means of military tribunal, provided it is 'used in case of necessity, and imminent danger … as in cases of rebellion [or] sudden invasion'. 13 But doubt persisted over whether martial law could be invoked if circumstances were not so grave as to prevent the ordinary courts from functioning. 14 Imperial expansion, increasing prosperity and peace in Great Britain (if not in
Ireland and many of the colonies), however, had long combined to push uncertainties over the 'disengagement between martial law as theory and as praxis' from policy makers' agendas.
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The spectre of imperial collapse and the exigencies of the First and Second World War brought the issue of these 'meagre' powers back to prominence in the twentieth century. 16 In the face of these threats the courts restricted their oversight of the operation of emergency
powers. An early indication that the bounds upon martial law were loosening came during the resulting from lawful acts of war'. 42 The developing UK practice of enacting an emergency code to deal with emergency situations could be made to conform to these requirements. Just as an emergency code, for the duration it is in effect, would abrogate certain human rights, so an accompanying derogation would act as its external face, preventing the UK from falling foul of its international commitments. The ECHR did not stipulate that the notification needed to give extensive detail as to the basis for asserting an emergency to the Council of Europe, nor did it impose a duty to regularly report on the use of the emergency powers once a derogation was in place. Parliamentary probing, media or civil society investigation or subsequent litigation would often be needed to bring further details of the actual operation of emergency powers to light.
Caroline Elkins, assessing the suppression of the Mau Mau insurgency in 1950s Kenya, has noted the incongruence between the UK's acceptance that the right to liberty under the ECHR extended to Kenya and its reliance upon 'a policy of mass detention' in this colony.
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From the outset of the ECHR, parts of the UK Government, and in particular the Colonial
Office, reacted to the new human rights mechanisms with hostility, strenuously resisting the ability of individuals to petition the Strasbourg institutions. 44 This official mind set was the product of concerns over the need to preserve freedom of action in response to emergency situations. 45 Given the Colonial Office's distain for the ECHR, derogations were often issued late and the reasons provided to the Council of Europe tended to be 'laconic in the extreme'. 46 On the ground, colonial administrators responding to emergencies tended to assume that tried-and-tested 'UK precedents', 47 such as maintaining internment for the duration of an emergency, were in line with the new human rights requirements. 48 At the outset of the Kenya Emergency, for example, many of the communications which flowed back and forth between London and Nairobi concerned how internment had functioned in the Internment had, however, been thoroughly tarnished as a response to terrorism in Northern Ireland, and the UK's derogation was focused upon the power to detain individuals without trial. 98 In August 1984, seeking to trumpet the UK's shift to a counter-terrorism strategy based around criminal law which was intended to delegitimise paramilitary groups, the UK withdrew its derogation from Article 5. The Government did so in the course of the summer parliamentary recess, thereby avoiding awkward questions, and presented the shift as a sign of its concern for human rights. 99 But at a stage when the "Troubles" seemed particularly intractable and when internment had not been in operation for almost a decade, the Thatcher Government did not seem to be losing any security dividend in giving up the derogation and relying instead upon the qualifications and limitations within many of the ECHR rights to sustain its security measures. 100 From the outset, however, Government legal advisers noted that this criminalisation approach relied upon a heavily modified version of criminal due process, including police powers of pre-charge detention for up to seven days without judicial oversight, 101 and that without the cover of a derogation ECHR compliance was dependent upon the European Court operating 'not too strict an approach to these provisions'.
Deepening the Legalisation of Emergencies
In Brogan 103 Strasbourg refused to oblige, maintaining that even in the circumstances of a terrorist campaign the right to liberty required judicial oversight of police powers of detention prior to charges being brought. 104 Following this decision the Home Secretary Douglas Hurd asked the Commons for time to consider the possible responses. 105 Two weeks later, on the final day of the parliamentary session before the Christmas recess, in a standing committee considering the reform of counter-terrorism measures, the Home Secretary announced that the UK would derogate from the ECHR. 106 The day after Parliament went into recess the Council of Europe was notified that the UK was issuing a new derogation.
Once again, the legalised nature of the derogation system allowed the UK to side-step parliamentary safeguards. Through the efforts of successive UK Governments' to minimise the oversight of their counter-terrorism activities, emergencies went from being an issue so intrinsically political that the European Court could not be trusted to adjudicate upon them in the 1950s, to being considered so legalised by the 1980s that Parliament could be marginalised in derogation decisions.
Once the derogation was in place it was maintained without much parliamentary difficulty. The House of Commons was simply informed in writing that the derogation would remain in place for as long as the Government considered it to be necessary. 107 Thereafter the maintenance of the derogation was rolled into the annual renewal debates on the counter- Act had enhanced Parliament's involvement in the issuing of a derogation, 132 with MPs having to accept a statutory instrument authorising the derogation. 133 The other newly-minted element of Parliament's human rights procedure, the Joint Committee on Human Rights, provided parliamentarians with detailed guidance into the legislative proposals and Article 15 in advance of the Commons' statutory instrument debate. 134 Although this debate was confined to a 90-minute session late one November night, the Government was challenged over a how a derogation could be squared with its claims that its legislation was human-rights compatible. 135 The Government's blithe response was that because the ECHR provides a derogation mechanism, 136 using it 'preserves unequivocally -this is an important point -our international obligations'. 137 148 Even with this leeway the unanimous judgment recapitulated the House of Lords' summary of case law on whether an emergency existed, 149 and accepted that it is 'for each Government, as the guardian of their own people's safety, to make its own assessment on the basis of the facts known to it'. 150 Nothing in this approach seems to displace claims that 'the de facto existence of a state of emergency is left to the political sphere', and more specifically to executive actors. 151 As for the assessment of whether detention without trial was proportionate, the Grand Chamber stuck closely to the domestic court's line of reasoning. 152 This decision has therefore drawn adverse comment for 'expressly endorsing a wide margin of appreciation on both legal questions -public emergency and proportionality of measures'. 153 The Court did, however, confined this wide margin of appreciation to 'relations between the domestic authorities and the Court', thereby encouraging domestic courts not to adhere to its light-touch approach. 154 By endorsing the House of Lords' proportionality assessment, Strasbourg effectively delegated the primary responsibility for evaluating a derogation's validity to domestic courts, emphasising that such review should not be clouded by the margin of appreciation. 155 This approach might appear to push oversight of derogations even further into the legal sphere, at the risk of marginalising the involvement of domestic assemblies in scrutinising their inception and operation. Strasbourg, however, also linked its extensive the margin of appreciation to parliamentary engagement with relevant expert reports into a derogation. 156 Building upon its earlier approach in Marshall, the Court picked up on the cursory Government responses to the Newton Committee report 157 and Joint
Committee on Human Rights reports 158 on Part IV of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act and the European Commissioner for Human Rights' complaints regarding 'the lack of sufficient scrutiny by Parliament of the derogation provisions'. 159 These considerations wrong-footed UK Government attempts to claim that executive detention 'was not only the product of the judgment of the Government but was also the subject of debate in Parliament'. 160 The Court might be delegating the primary responsibility for assessing invocations of Article 15 to domestic organs, but such a delegation cannot be dismissed as neglecting its own oversight duties.
The Future of Derogations
Although the limited role played by derogations has been one of the most surprising features of the ECHR's history, 161 equally remarkable has been how the UK has bucked this general 
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Nothing in the unanimous Grand Chamber decision in A v United Kingdom suggests that, in any legal challenge arising from these derogations, Strasbourg will be quick to revisit its own standards in applying the key tests for a derogation. This case does, nonetheless, indicate that a derogating state will have to demonstrate robust domestic oversight of its emergency powers if it is to take advantage of the broad margin of appreciation available under Article 15. A challenge to the French or Ukrainian derogations will test whether the Court is willing to sustain this approach, and extend it to cover the timing and content of a derogation notice.
If it is not, derogations could begin to play an increasingly significant role in the life of the ECHR.
163 Dyzenhaus characterises such circumstances as involving legal constraints which 'are so insubstantial that they pretty well permit government to do as it pleases'; D. Dyzenhaus, 
